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ARGUMENT

This case is about a slip and fall on a landowner's property at nighttime. On this
night, Ms. Carla Lyman was a business invitee, on her way to Ms. Ruthellen Pollan's
home to care for Ms. Pollan. Ms. Lyman parked on a public road in front of Ms. Pollan's
home, and began walking toward Ms. Pollan's home, up the driveway. On each night
over the ten months prior, there was a lamp lit at the end of the front walkway in front of
Ms. Pollan's home, illuminating the driveway and walkway.

The driveway was

composed of round river rocks and gravel, so the light served to allow for the safer
passage of Ms. Lyman each night that she had to walk up the driveway. On this night,
the light was not lit. Ms. Lyman continued toward the home in the dark. Then she fell.
Ms. Lyman cried out for help and was taken to a local hospital for treatment of broken
bones suffered in the fall.
These are the facts presented in Ms. Lyman's deposition. Solomon has misstated
the testimony to support a disposition in his favor, rather than present the facts in light of
Ms. Lyman's testimony, which are in Ms. Lyman's favor. This Court should not be
misled by the inaccurate representations of Solomon and should reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment.
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the grant
for correctness, without deference to the lower court's decision. Poteet v. White, 2006
UT 63, <f 7, 147 P.3d 439. Further, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, all facts
and inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Carrier v. Salt Lake
County. 2004 UT 98,«([ 3, 104 P.3d 1208. Additionally, "summary judgment is generally

inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and should be employed 'only in the most
clear-cut case/" Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126. 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam),
and "[accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of
care is 'fixed by law,' and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the
Defendant's negligence under the circumstances." Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d
821, 825 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
"As part of the inquiry, the court must apply an objective standard to determine
whether a genuine issue of material fact remains. Newman v. White Water Whirlpool,
2008 UT 79,1| 11, 197 P.3d 654. The objective standard seeks to find whether reasonable
jurors, properly instructed, would be able to come to only one conclusion, or if they
might come to different conclusions, thereby making summary judgment inappropriate."
Clegg v. Wasatch County, 227 P.3d 1243, 1247. However, before the appellate court can
review a district court's ruling, the district court ruling must set forth the grounds upon
which the ruling is rendered. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The summary judgment grant should be reversed for three primary reasons. First,
Solomon has misstated, and continues to misstate, the law and facts. Second, there is at
least one genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Finally, the
ruling in this case was deficient, precluding appellate review.
I.

Solomon Misstates the Facts and Law
Throughout this case, Solomon has misstated (a) the facts and (b) that law that

guide its resolution.

a.

The Facts

While a motion for summary judgment only deals with the applicable law in a
case, the facts of a case dictate the area of law that applies. The facts as reworked by
Solomon—if the Court were to go against the dictates of Rule 56 and take them in the
light most favorable to Solomon—may support the grant of a motion for summary
judgment. However, the facts as presented by Ms. Lyman at her deposition paint a
different picture.
The elements and layout of the premises on which Ms. Lyman was injured are of
primary importance in this case. It can be difficult to discern the layout of a premises
based on deposition testimony. Unfortunately, that is exactly what is required here. In
the end, the resolution of this case depends heavily on the presence and orientation of five
things: (1) a house; (2) a pathway; (3) a yard light; (4) a driveway; and (5) a public road.
In turn, each of the elements must be properly disclosed to the Court.
i,

Solomon's Reworked Facts

Throughout his briefs at both the trial- and appellate levels, Solomon
misrepresents the facts of this case:
1.

Solomon establishes that there is a dirt road to which Ms. Pollan's home is

adjacent: "Pollan's home was adjacent to an unpaved, unimproved dirt and gravel road,
which Lyman describes, in part, as 'just a dirt road' (the 'Dirt Road')." (Br. of Appellee
at 3 (emphasis in original).) This fact is only objectionable insofar as Solomon later
subsumes Pollan's driveway within the "Dirt Road."

2.

Solomon improperly commingles the Pollan driveway with the public road,

in spite of noting the presence of a driveway: "Lyman refers to the Dirt Road as a
'driveway.' However, the Dirt Road and what Lyman refers to as a driveway are one and
the same,

(See R. 270, 53:13-54:14) (providing that Lyman would walk along the

driveway to access the cement walkway that lead [sic] to Pollan's front door)[.]" (Br. of
Appellee at 4, TI 5.)
3.

Then, Solomon extends a pathway all the way from Ms. Pollan's door

down to the public road that runs north and south in front of Ms. Pollan's front door, with
citations to, but no actual basis in, the record. "A cement pathway runs east and west
from the Dirt Road to Pollan's house. (R. 268, 45:6-11; R. 270, 53:23-54:14.)" (Br. of
Appellee at 4.)
4.

Solomon then places the yard lamp next to the public road. "[A] yard lamp

sits on Pollan's property where the cement pathway meets the Dirt Road."

(Br. of

Appellee at 4.)
Solomon consistently conflates the "Dirt Road" and Ms. Pollan's driveway
through the entirety of the brief reading out the presence of a driveway on Ms. Pollan's
property in spite of noting the driveway in footnote 5 on page 4 of the brief. (See Br. of
Appellee at 4; see also generally Br. of Appellee.)
5.

Solomon indicated to the trial court that Ms. Pollan was "bedridden" at the

time of Ms. Lyman's fall despite a lack of testimony establishing the same. (R. 257.)

ii.

The Facts Stated Under Oath by Ms. Lvman

Ms. Lyman testified as follows:
1,

There is a road in front of the Pollan home that runs north and south:
"Q.
A.

And so the roadway in front of her home runs north and south?
Uh-huh." (R. 268, 46: 9—11.)

The road in front of the Pollan home is a dirt and gravel road:
"Q.

2.

So would you - but the street in front of her home, was it paved?

A.

No.

Q.

Dirt road?

A.

A dirt and gravel road/' (R. 267, 44: 15—19.)

There is also a driveway near the Pollan home:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

When you came to the house, did you always park in the same
place?
No, because she had a lot of visitors and there were other cars there.
Where did you normally park if you had the choice? Where did you
like to park?
Just right in that same area. I stopped driving up her gravel
driveway because of the noise, and it was all dirt and rocks anyway.

(R. 267,44:6—14.)
Ms. Lyman was unable to drive up the driveway far enough to get to the
walkway on this night:
"Q.

Okay. So you would go on the driveway far enough to get to the
pathway, or the walkway?

A.

The dirt road? I couldn't that night." (R. 270, 53: 19—22.)

Ms. Lyman parked north of the entrance to Ms. Pol Ian's home:

wi

Q.

And tell me where you parked your car.

A.

I parked north of the entrance because there was [sic] other cars
parked." (R. 268, 46: 3—5.)

3.

There is a walkway on the Pol Ian property:
"Q.

Is there any sidewalk in front of her home?

A.

Just the one from the front door to where the light was. I mean - -

Q.

So there's a walkway from the front door to the light?

A.

Cement." (R. 268, 45: 6—11.)

The walkway runs from the front door of the Pollan home to the driveway:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

You said there was a cement walkway from her front door to the
lamp.
I think it's cement. It was.
And is that the walkway you would get on and go to the front door?
Yes.
And you would do that every time?
Uh-huh.

Q,
A.

Does that walkway come over to the driveway?
Uh-huh. Yes.

(R. 270,53:23—54:14.)
4.

A yard lamp is positioned at the end of the walkway by the driveway:
U

Q.

And this light that was burned out, where was it located?

A.

At the end of the front sidewalk, by the driveway," (R. 267, 43:

22—25.)
5.

Ms. Pollan employed Ms. Lyman to help her with her day-to-day needs:
Q.

Going back to some of the duties you had, I wanted to make sure we
talked about all of them just a little bit.

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A.

Okay.
Did you help her dress herself? Did she need help doing that?
Uh-huh. Yes.
Bathing?
Yes.
Hygiene?
Yes.
Okay. And so tell me about anything else that you did as part of
your job that I haven't brought up.
Took care of her medications with the doctor, treatments, set up
appointments when she needed to go to the Huntsman Center. And
scheduled her art events and - - I don't know. I just did whatever
she needed me to.

(R. 327,35:3—21.)
Notably absent from Ms. Lyman's testimony are any indications of: (1) which side
of the road the Pollan home sits on; (2) which direction the gravel driveway runs; (3)
which direction the walkway runs; (4) where the walkway meets up with the driveway in
relation to the house; (5) where the driveway is positioned relative to the house; and (6)
where the driveway connects with the dirt road in relation to the house. Solomon has
misrepresented the record and presumed facts that are favorable for a summary judgment
disposition in his favor.
Solomon has taken liberty in describing the layout without a basis in the record,
subsuming a driveway within a uDirt Road," and including an indication that a pathway
connects directly with the "Dirt Road."

(See Br. of Appellee at 4.)

Solomon's

description does not follow from the deposition testimony.
The duty that attaches depends heavily, if not exclusively, on the presence of the
driveway and its relationship to the front door of the Pollan home. (R. 294—95.) If the
Pollan home were—as Solomon has described it beginning in the trial court up through

this appeal—abutting a public "Dirt Road," lacking a driveway, this would be a different
case. However, the duty that attaches in this case attaches because Ms. Lyman fell on the
Pollan home's property, on the driveway—not on a "Dirt Road" which Pollan did not
create or maintain, and over which Pollan did not exercise any form of control. This is
important because Solomon represented to the district court that Ms. Lyman fell on the
dirt road, rather than the driveway, (R. 260, 353.)
Solomon's misstatement of facts severely undermined the trial court's, and
undermines this Court's, ability to properly determine whether a duty attached to Pollan's
reception of Ms. Lyman. In light of the misstatements of facts, it is now more clear as to
why the lower court would have granted Solomon's summary judgment motion—a
landowner should not be deemed liable for an unfortunate occurrence to an invitee while
the invitee makes her way on a public road near the landowner's home. However, in
light of the facts testified to by Ms. Lyman, summary judgment was inappropriate and
should be reversed.
In addition to misstating the facts of this case, Solomon has misstated the law.
b.

The Law

Solomon has misstated the law on multiple occasions. While the law is open to
interpretation, some principles are so fundamental that arguing a contrary view is
frivolous. Three such instances occurred in Solomon's briefs.
i.

The Elevated Duty of Care Owed to a Business Invitee

At the trial court, Solomon argued that there was no special relationship between
Pollan and Ms. Lyman, but conceded the impropriety of such an argument to this Court:

[Solomon] argued to the trial court that summary judgment was proper
because there was no special relationship between Pollan and Lyman. . . .
However, Pollan does not assert the special relationship argument on
appeal. Pollan has since determined and recognizes that a special
relationship likely exists between owners and invitees and that Lyman was
likely Pollan's invitee.
(Br. of Appellee at 10, n. 7.)
It is hornbook law that landowners owe an elevated duty of care to invitees. It is
also hornbook law that landowners owe an elevated duty of care to business invitees.
Any argument to the contrary borders on frivolous. And yet, Solomon made these exact
arguments to the trial court in his briefs. Such arguments only served to confuse the
issues and detract from the end goal of litigation—to resolve issues fairly and accurately.
ii.

Respondeat Superior Liability for the Acts of an Agent on One's Premises

Solomon's misstatements of the law did not cease at the district court level. On
appeal, Solomon argues, 'There is no evidence in the record that Pollan (or any employee
or agent) . . . had any obligation to maintain or inspect the Dirt Road." (Br. of Appellee
at 24.) Solomon makes this argument after acknowledging in his brief that Pollan owned
the area where Lyman fell. {See Br. of Appellee at 3, n. 3 ("Pollan admitted that she
owned the "subject premises" in response to Request No. 5 of Lyman's first set of
requests for admissions (R. 194). . . .").)
This argument also borders on frivolous. As briefed by Lyman in the district
court, landowners owe a nondelegable duty to maintain the safety of their property for
invitees. This is a matter of law, not fact. There is no need for evidence to establish that
a landowner owes a duty of care to invitees on the landowner's property.

In this case, Pollan was dependent on others for her care. (R. 327, 35: 3—21.)
Yet, it has not been established that Pollan was "bedridden." (Id., compare R. at 257.) In
light of her own inability to conduct maintenance, Pollan hired a maintenance person for
her property. (See R, at 267, 42: 21—25.) Lyman testified that a maintenance person
had the responsibility to perform maintenance around the home,
"Q.

And - oh, whose responsibility was it to make sure things got repaired
around the home?

A.

There was a maintenance person, Jerry Perez." (R. 267, 42: 21—25.)

Pollan remains liable for an omission on her property that gives rise to injury,
whether that omission was committed by her agent or herself. Solomon's argument to
the contrary is baseless and improper.
iii.

Liability for Open and Obvious Dangerous Conditions

Solomon argues, "Pollan owed no duty to warn Lyman of the general condition . .
. where it should have been obvious and know to Lyman . . . ." (Br. of Appellee at 31—
32.) However, this is a misstatement of the law—law that Solomon goes on to quote: "A
possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused by an activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." (Id., citing Hale v.
Beckstead, 2005 UT 24 atffi[7—9, 14.)
The latter portion of the quote precludes summary judgment: "unless the possessor
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." Hale, 2005 UT 24
atffl[7—9, 116 P.3d 263. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pollan
m

should have anticipated the harm that would be incurred by falling on the uneven
driveway despite Ms. Lyman's knowledge of the uneven surface or the obviousness of
the same.
II.

There is at Least One Genuine Issue of Material Fact
In addition to genuine issues of material fact referenced above, the presence of a

duty and the question of breach present genuine issues of material fact in this case. The
duty that presents itself in this case is two-fold in light of the two hazardous conditions
present on the relevant night: (a) the temporary hazardous condition presented by the
unlit light; and (b) the permanent hazardous condition presented by the uneven driveway,
landscaped with round river rocks.
a.

The Unlit Light Presented a Temporary Hazardous Condition

Utah's slip and fall jurisprudence is clear regarding temporary hazardous
conditions. It requires actual or constructive notice of a temporary hazardous condition
before liability may attach for injuries. In the event the landowner creates the temporary
hazardous condition, the notice requirement does not apply. See Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008
UT 67, T] 29, 196 P.3d 576 (holding "[Plaintiff] may recover under a temporary unsafe
condition theory if the puddle was created by [the landowner] because the notice
requirement does not apply to owner-created temporary unsafe conditions. And because
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding who created the puddle, we remand the
case to the district court for a jury to determine whether [the landowner] created it and
might therefore be liable for [Plaintiffs] injuries.").

Constructive notice is "where

information or knowledge of a fact is imputed to a person by law 'because he could have
11

discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as to cast upon him the
duty of inquiring into it.'" In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, f 22 n. 9, 86 P.3d
712 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed.1991)); see also Meyer v. General Am.
Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977) ("Constructive notice can occur when
circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further
inquiry on his part.").1
As in Jex, there is a question of fact as to whether Ms. Pollan created the
temporary unsafe condition presented by the unlit lamp. See Jex v. JRA, 2008 UT 67 at <[J
29. Even if Ms. Pollan did not create the condition, the facts support the view that Ms.
Pollan had constructive notice of the unlit lamp. Ms. Pollan and Ms. Lyman shared a
special relationship that gave rise to an elevated duty on Ms. Pollan's behalf. Ms. Pollan
or her agent could have discovered the unlit light by "proper diligence" by simply
flipping a switch once it became dark outside or looking out a window.2 There was an
ongoing duty to ensure the light remained lit to allow Ms. Lyman, an invitee, to pass
safely to perform her job for Ms. Pollan.

1

Ms. Lyman's coming onto Ms. Pollan's

Solomon suggests that this case is comparable to a range of slip and fall cases involving
invitees and businesses. However, none of the cases cited by Solomon addressed facts
involving an invitee and a property owner that undertook services that were necessary for
the safety of the invitee—Solomon undertook the responsibility to light the front walk for
Ms. Lyman's safe passage. See Rest. 2d Torts § 323 below.
2
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power and Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998) may seem to support a
contrary result. However, the plaintiff in Fishbaugh was not an invitee to a private
party's property. This case is different. The relationship of the parties in this case is one
such that a reasonable degree of diligence in receiving the invitee is required. In turn,
Fishbaugh does not serve to abrogate landowner liability in this case, and whether Ms.
Pollan's diligence was reasonable presents a genuine issue of material fact that precludes
summary judgment.
12

property each night to attend to her needs "should [have] put a reasonable person on
guard so as to require further inquiry on [Ms. Pollan's] part." See Meyer, 569 P.2d at
1097. Allowing the light to remain unlit, even for part of one night, exposed Ms. Lyman
to the risk of falling on the uneven driveway surface. In this case, Ms. Pollan allowed the
light to remain unlit long enough to subject Ms. Lyman to injury. Ms. Pollan, or her
agent, should have recognized that the yard lamp was out when the lamp was not
illuminated for Ms. Lyman.
Ms. Pollan knew of the uneven nature of the driveway. Ms. Pollan knew that there
was need for a light to illuminate Ms. Lyman's passage over the driveway and therefore
kept it lit previously. Ms. Lyman argued in the lower court that, by lighting the walkway,
Ms. Pollan undertook an elevated duty which she was required to discharge nonnegligently. (R. at 292—94.) That argument is substantiated by Restatement (Second) of
Torts §323 (1977):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
Rest. 2d Torts § 323 (1963) (cited with approval in OCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663
P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 1983)).
Ms. Pollan kept the light lit on previous nights; unfortunately, on the night at issue
the light was not illuminated. Ms. Lyman relied for her protection upon the light being lit
in

each time she walked up the driveway to Ms. Pollan's home. If the jury finds that Ms.
Pollan did not reasonably discharge her duty to keep the lamp lit, she may be deemed
negligent and subject to liability for Ms. Lyman's injuries.
The grant of summary judgment was improper. This is not a simple slip and fall
case involving a store owner and an invitee slipping on something in the store. Rather,
under the facts, Ms. Pollan had constructive notice of the hazardous condition presented
by the unlit light and may bear liability because of the unlit lamp. Additionally, Ms.
Pollan undertook the duty to keep the lamp lit for the safe passage of Ms. Lyman and Ms.
Lyman relied on the same. Under either or both theories, Solomon may be liable for the
injuries suffered by Ms. Lyman.
b.

The Driveway Presents a Permanent Hazardous Condition

The driveway on the Pollan property represented a permanent hazardous
condition. The permanent hazardous condition—the uneven driveway—was constructed
by, and under the exclusive control of, Ms. Pollan. Landowners are liable for permanent
hazardous conditions on their property that cause injury to invitees. See Canfield v.
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding grocer liable under
permanent unsafe condition for slip and fall victim's injuries arising from slip on lettuce
leaves; leaves were present on floor due to method of display that lead to possibility of
lettuce leaves being strewn on floor where customers would walk) (cited with approval,
but not applied, in Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, If 26, 196 P.3d 576). Ms. Lyman had no
choice but to traverse the driveway to access Ms. Pollan's home. She had done so many

14

times before. Although she did not fall in past visits, the permanent dangerous condition
persisted—the driveway was always uneven and contained smooth, round rocks.
Solomon cites to the unpublished opinion of Hone v. ZZXYZ Management Group,
L.L.C.. 2004 WL 440396 indicating that uthis Court held that landscaping was not a
permanent unsafe condition." (Br. of Appellee at 14.)

In actuality, the Hone holding

was limited in scope to the facts of Hone, indicating: "Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, in
this case, landscaping is not a method of operation, and is unrelated to the way
Defendants conduct their business.

Defendants did nothing to encourage patrons to

interact with the landscape or to remove rocks from the landscape." Hone, 2004 WL
440396 at * 2 (declining to apply Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992). In Hone, the court found that the unsafe condition would not have
presented itself absent an intervening act. Id. at * 1. This case is different. The unsafe
condition of the uneven driveway presented itself even absent an intervening act.
It is true that there is a dearth of Utah case law on point addressing a permanent
unsafe condition presented by a rural driveway. However, the Utah Supreme Court in the
case of De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1956) addressed a
permanent structure appurtenant to a building and indicated that, under the right
conditions, the entranceway of terrazzo may have been deemed an unsafe condition, and
that such a determination was for the jury. Ms. Lyman does not move for a summary
disposition on the issue of negligence. She moves for the opportunity to have questions
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This statement represents another misstatement of law, perhaps more properly
addressed in Section 1 above.
i*

of fact resolved by a jury. Hone and De Weese both stand for the proposition that a case
like Ms. Lyman's cannot be resolved as a matter of law, but that questions still present in
Ms. Lyman's case can only be properly resolved by a jury.
The combination of the temporary hazardous condition posed by the unlit yard
lamp and the permanent hazardous condition posed by the unsafe driveway resulted in a
serious injury. Whether Ms. Pollan was negligent due to her failure to assure the safe
passage of Ms. Lyman presents a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable
minds may differ. For this reason, the grant of summary judgment was improper and
should be reversed.
III.

The District Court's Order is Deficient
The district court's order granting summary judgment indicated, "Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted." (R. 396—97.) The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure allow only one view of the underlying ruling: the ruling is deficient. Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires, "The court shall . . . issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b),
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground." Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a). The brief statement by the lower court does not state the ground for its
decision on the motion granted under Rule 56, even though Solomon's motion was based
on more than one ground, and therefore does not satisfy Rule 52(a).
The Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc.,
2003 UT 23,1 16, 70 P.3d 904 addressed the level of specificity with which a court must
address a motion for summary judgment in a ruling:
16

When a court decides a motion for summary judgment, rule 52 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[t]he court shall . . . issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision . . . when the motion is
based on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In an earlier case,
we noted that the purpose of rule 52 is to give the parties a written
indication of the court's reasoning and held that a "court need only include
the basic essentials of the grounds upon which it relies" to comply with the
rule.
Id. at II 16 (citation omitted).
Failure to comply with the mandates of Rule 52 may subject a summary judgment
resolution to reversal. The Utah Court of Appeals in Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2001 UT App 277, ^f 10, 34 P.3d 234, addressed the possibility of reversal of a summary
judgment disposition in light of the failure to comply with Rule 52:
Although failure to adhere to Rule 52 does not, in and of itself, warrant
reversal, see Retherfordv. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 958 n. 4
(Utah 1992), "the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court
rulings 'has little operative effect when [we] cannot divine the trial court's
reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its ruling.'" Id. (quoting Allen v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992)).
Gabriel 2001 UT App 277 at 1 10.
The Gabriel court reversed the district court's summary judgment disposition,
noting, "In granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court stated that it
granted the motion for the reasons set forth in the City's supporting memorandum. The
trial court did not explain the basis for its decision." Id. at ^ 9.
In this case, the district court ruling stated: "Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted." (R. 397.) The district court's ruling is deficient. It does not even
go so far as the ruling in Gabriel to incorporate the reasoning of the moving party. It is
impossible to "divine the trial court's reasoning" in this case. Even Solomon notes in his

appellee brief, "Given the brevity of the district court's ruling, it is unclear which [of the
three arguments raised by Solomon below] . . . the district court found most persuasive."4
(Br. of Appellee at 10, n. 7.) It is unclear whether the lower court relied on an inaccurate
statement of the law or fact, as discussed in the remainder of this brief.
In light of the deficient ruling, this Court cannot properly review the trial court's
decision. See Gabriel, 2001 UT App 277 at ^ 8. In that the Court cannot properly review
the trial court's decision, it should reverse the order granting summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

This case is not a case that can presently be resolved as a matter of law. Even the
layout of the property cannot be agreed upon. Ms. Lyman has testified to one layout and
Solomon has urged another, without any form of evidence to establish the alternative
layout. If nothing else, a question of fact persists as to which layout is the actual layout
of the Pollan property. As discussed, the layout is of primary importance and must be
resolved by a trier of fact.

It is not the province of summary judgment to weigh

conflicting evidence. See generally Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Atkin, Wright &
Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) ("[When considering a motion for summary
judgment,] [t]he trial court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility.") (footnote
omitted). The only way a motion for summary judgment may properly be granted against
Lyman is if it is "obvious" that Lyman, based on the facts construed in her favor, is
precluded from recovering as a matter of law—she is not. "[Lyman] must be able to
4

It should be noted, as discussed in footnote 2 below, that at least one of the three
inaccurate arguments raised by Solomon below was conceded, by Solomon, to be an
inaccurate presentation of the law to the court.
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present [her] case[] fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against [her]
unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that [Lyman] . . . can establish no
right to recovery." See id. at 1261 (footnote omitted). Lyman's opportunity to present
her case was improperly foreclosed by the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
The proceedings below were tainted by Solomon's misrepresentations of Lyman's
testimony, as discussed above; the proceedings were dependent on misrepresentations of
the facts and law by Solomon. Further, summary judgment was improperly granted as
genuine issues of material fact persist. Finally, the lower court's ruling does not conform
with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each of these factors supports the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. In turn, the grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
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